| Entry |
Definition |
|
idealism |
A brand of monism, first forwarded by Berkeley,
in which everything is mental, as contrasted to materialism. |
|
identity theory |
The identity theory (IT) of mind is standardly understood to be the claim
that every mental property is identical with some physical property. |
|
imagination |
Traditionally, the mental capacity for experiencing, constructing, or
manipulating 'mental imagery' (quasi-perceptual experience). Imagination
is also regarded as responsible for fantasy, inventiveness, idiosyncrasy,
and creative, original, and insightful thought in general, and, sometimes,
for a much wider range of mental activities dealing with the non-actual,
such as supposing, pretending, 'seeing as', thinking of possibilities,
and even being mistaken. See representation. |
|
implicit memory |
Implicit memory is evident when the performance of a subject on a task
is improved despite the inability of the subject to consciously recollect
memories which facilitate to the task. See also explicit
memory, memory. |
|
induction |
A method of reasoning by which one infers a generalization from a series
of instances. See abduction, deduction. |
|
individualism |
See internalism. |
|
intentional stance, the |
A strategy, proposed and defended by Daniel Dennett, for understanding
an entity's behavior. When adopting the intentional stance towards an
entity, we attempt to explain and predict its behavior by treating it
as if it were a rational agent whose actions are governed by its beliefs
and desires. The intentional stance contrasts with two other strategies,
the physical stance and the design stance. See Dennett,
Daniel, intentionality. |
|
intentionalism |
The thesis that all mental states are representational states. Specifically,
raw feels and qualia, are said to have representational
content. |
|
intentionality |
The property of the mind by which it is directed at, about, or 'of' objects
and events in the world. Aboutness - in the manner of beliefs, fears,
desires, etc. |
|
intentionality, derived |
The power of a system (e.g. the mind) to be "about" something
if that power is derived from that system's connection to another, already
intentional system. Language's intentionality is said to be derived from
that of the mind. |
|
intentional action |
People normally distinguish between behaviors that are performed ‘intentionally’
and those that are performed ‘unintentionally.’ But philosophers have
found it quite difficult to explain precisely what the distinction amounts
to. At first glance, it may appear that an action can only be performed
intentionally if the agent had an intention to perform it,
but even this seemingly trivial characterization has been remarkably controversial.
See action; intention-in-action;
prior intention. |
|
intention-in-action |
The intentional or mental component of an action. The intention in action
causes, and is contemporaneous with, the agent's bodily movement or state
that is its condition of satisfaction. Introduced in Searle
1983. See also intentionality, prior
intention, Background, phenomenological
critique of representationalism, the will. |
|
intention, prior |
Intention formed prior to the action that is its condition of satisfaction.
The prior intention represents the projected action as a unified whole.
Introduced in Searle 1983. See also intentionality,
intention-in-action. |
|
interactionism |
See dualism. |
|
internalism |
Internalists hold that mental events supervene
only on physical events internal to the body of the subject of those mental
events. Also known as individualism. See also externalism. |
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