Entry	Definition
parallel distributed processing (PDP)	See connectionism.
parallelism	The view that mental and physical phenomena occur in parallel but that these simultaneities never involve causal interactions. See dualism, preestablished harmony, occasionalism. <Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith
perception	The 'how it is' to cognitive systems in the world. A means of distinguishing how things are from how a cognizer thinks they are. <Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith
phenomenalism	The monistic view that all empirical statements (such as the laws of physics) can be placed in a one to one correspondence with statements about only the phenomenal (i.e. mental appearances). (See idealism, neutral monism, monism). <Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith
phenomenological critique of representationalism	Rejection of the notion that representational states define and explain the most basic kind of human interaction with the environment. See also representation, phenomenology, intention-in-action, Background, Hubert Dreyfus. <Discussion> <References> Daniel Barbiero
phenomenology	(1) subjective or phenomenal experience (2) a systematic study of consciousness from a first-person perspective originated by Husserl. <Discussion> <References> S. Gallagher
philosophy, experimental	Philosophers often make claims about people’s intuitions regarding particular cases. Experimental philosophy aims to put these claims to the test using standard empirical methods. <Discussion> <References> Joshua M. Knobe
philosophy of mind	The branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of mental phenomena in general and the role of consciousness, sensation, perception, concepts, action, reasoning, intention, belief, memory, etc. in particular. Standard problems include those of free will, personal identity, mind-body problem, other minds, computationalism, etc. <Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith
philosophy of psychology	The branch of the philosophy of science concerned specifically with psychology. It is concerned with the sorts of models, theories and explanations used in psychology to address psychological phenomena. See also philosophy of mind. <Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith
physical stance	See intentional stance <Discussion> <References> Amy Kind
physicalism	The view that everything that is real is, in some sense, really physical. See also materialism. <Discussion> <References> Pete Mandik & Peter Zachar
physicalism, non-reductive	The claim that functional properties cannot be reduced to physical properties, but that nevertheless all causality is physical. See physicalism, multiple realizability, functionalism. <Discussion> <References> Teed Rockwell
plans	A stable, often incomplete formulation of a program of action. <Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith
practical reasoning	See reasoning, practical.
preestablished harmony, doctrine of	A view originated by G. W. leibniz whereby: (1) the mental and the material comprise two different kinds of substance; (2) neither has any direct causal effect on the other and; (3) the coincidence between mental and material events is due to both substances being created to act in concert even though there is no post-creation interaction between the two. See dualism, occasionalism, parallelism. <Discussion> <References> Pete Mandik
productivity (of thought)	Thought is said to be productive, since, in a sense, normal cognitive agents are capable of having denumerably many distinct thoughts. In other words, to say that thought is productive means that normal cognitive agents have the competence to entertain denumerably many distinct thoughts. <Discussion> <References> Ken Aizawa
property dualism	The view that the mental and the physical comprise two different classes of property that are coinstantiated in the same objects. See dualism, substance dualism. <Discussion> <References> Pete Mandik

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