realism

Briefly, a realist about x holds that x enjoys mind-independent existence, that is, x exists regardless of whether anyone thinks, hopes or fears that x exists.
<Discussion> < References> Pete Mandik

realization

A set of properties P realize a set of properties M just in case the instantiation of the properties in P is sufficient for the instantiation of the properties in M. See also physicalism, token identity theory, supervenience, and functionalism. 
<Discussion> <References> Pete Mandik

reasoning, practical

Figuring out what to do; reasoning directed towards action (as contrasted with reasoning directed towards arriving at belief).
<Discussion> <References> Elijah Millgram

reference

A property of a representation which denotes what the representation is about, or 'of'. See sense, intentionality.
<Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith

referential opacity

Two terms are referentially opaque if they cannot be substituted salva veritate (i.e. without changing the truth value of the statement).
<Discussion> <References> Charles Wallis

representation

That which stands for, refers to or denotes something or the relation between a thing and that which stands for or denotes it. See distributed representation,symbolicism, dynamic systems theory.
<Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith

representation, distributed

A distributed representation is one in which meaning is not captured by a single symbolic unit, but rather arises from the interaction of a set of units, normally in a network of some sort.
<Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith

rule

A theoretical device for the explanation of behavioral regularities and/or cognitive states.  Rules are generally, but not always, characterized in terms of causally-operative mental representations. See computation, symbolicism, connectionism. 
<Discussion> <References> Daniel Barbiero